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ABSTRACT
This article analyzes the key resilience factors of the Italian firearms dis-
trict after World War II structured around four main questions: resilience 
of what, to what, by what means, and with what outcome. This study 
aims to improve and expand knowledge about the capacity and diffi-
culties of industrial districts to adapt to market changes and maintain 
their competitiveness. Our findings highlight that the successful recov-
ery was based on the conquest of a new market segment and a novel 
decentralised and flexible—although hierarchical—production struc-
ture achieved through the reorganisation of know-how and resources 
accumulated in the district. The advantages of local clustering and 
elevated levels of specialisation provided the district with an effective 
short-term adaptation to the post-war crisis and a stable long-term 
growth path.
1. Introduction
You come today among us, to a community that lives exclusively off its work, highly-qualified 
and honed by centuries of experience and commitment, and if the living conditions here are 
on the whole better than in other areas, it is due to the ability of our workers, the initiative of 
our entrepreneurs and hundreds of artisans, and the rich tradition of our vocational schools 
(Aa.Vv., 1988, p. 57).
With these words, Mayor Angelo Grazioli presented Gardone Val Trompia1 (hereafter Gardone) 
to the Italian Prime Minister, Aldo Moro, on an official visit to the municipality in 1966. Grazioli 
was clearly referring to the gun industry when he emphasised the role of work in the life of 
his community. Despite the serious problems faced by its specialised production at the end 
of World War II (WWII), the town of Gardone was able to participate in the Italian economic 
miracle by renewing its long tradition in firearms production. Through the umpteenth 
restructuring process, its specialisation survived. It was reshaped into a network formed by 
the largest and oldest production units, together with countless craft businesses. This study 
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aims to analyse the recovery process and identify the key resilience factors of the Italian 
firearms manufacturing district. The area, located 80 km east of Milan in the Lombardy region, 
northern Italy, still represents one of the driving manufacturing hubs of the country as the 
largest producer of small arms in Europe (ANPAM, 2017).
This study examines the resilience of the Italian gun-making district to changes in the 
market caused by the end of WWII and the development of the district’s production structure 
in the 1950s and 1960s. It shows how, in the technological and market context of that period, 
the configuration of the industrial district specialised strongly in civilian firearms. The decen-
tralised but hierarchical production structure—somewhere between the Marshallian district2 
(Becattini, 2004, pp. 7–17; Zeitlin, 2007, pp. 222–223) and the hub-and-spoke district3 of 
Markusen (1996, p. 302)—was supported by local institutions in generating substantial 
capacity for adaptation and giving rise to a stable development pattern. The district relied 
on the know-how and resources accumulated in the territory to generate a novel production 
structure and specialise in new market segments. This reorganisation strengthened the dis-
trict’s competitive advantage and fuelled a new phase of growth. Two large companies led 
the process: Fabbrica d’Armi Pietro Beretta (hereafter Beretta) and Società Anonima 
Bernardelli Vincenzo (hereafter Bernardelli), which served as the backbone of the decen-
tralised production structure and contributed decisively to the technological renewal and 
enhancement of the international reputation of the district’s products.
The time frame chosen allows an assessment of the outcomes of reconstruction and an 
in-depth analysis of the protagonists and main factors behind reconstruction. This article 
broadens the knowledge about the development of the firearms district and the emergence 
of industrial districts in Italy in the central decades of the twentieth century while providing 
insight into the factors determining the resilience of industrial regions. By adopting a busi-
ness history approach, this study provides new evidence for the debate on the sources of 
competitive advantage and the role of leading companies in the evolution of these districts. 
It also enriches the analysis of the post-war recovery of Italian production systems, incorpo-
rating the concept of resilience and the theoretical framework that economic geography 
has developed around it.
The topic is relevant and deserves detailed research, as industrial districts have played a 
key role in the economic development of many places, particularly in southern Europe. 
Currently, when many industrial districts are witnessing a period of severe decline, due in 
part to their difficulties in adapting to market changes, it is crucial to deepen our under-
standing of how the districts weathered other market shocks, how they kept their compet-
itiveness, and what were the pillars of their resilience.
This study is based on numerous unpublished written and oral sources. The written 
sources include the original questionnaires and summary charts of the industry and services 
census conducted by Istat (Italian National Institute of Statistics) in 1961, as well as reports 
and other documents on the state of the post-war firearms industry drawn from several local 
and national archives. The oral sources include three semi-structured interviews conducted 
by the authors with entrepreneurs from the district in Gardone between February 2016 and 
October 2017.
These interviews were designed, conducted, analysed, and reported following a rigorous 
methodology (Adams, 2015). The information derived from them is particularly useful in 
explaining how and why events occurred, revealing undocumented details of relationships, 
and filling gaps in extant documentary records (Crawford & Bailey, 2019, p. 7). Moreover, 
BuSINESS HISTORY 3
cross-checking oral sources with written ones was useful for two reasons. First, archival 
documents enabled us to avoid interview limits arising from memory distortion produced 
‘by physical deterioration and nostalgia in old age, by the personal bias of both interviewer 
and interviewee, and by the influence of collective and retrospective versions of the past’ 
(Thomson, 2007, p. 53). Second, the interviews prevented the study from falling into the 
trap of inadvertently repeating the narratives told by hegemonic stakeholders, such as pol-
icymakers and leading companies, which forms the basis of most of the Italian armament 
business historiography (Maclean et al., 2017, p. 1233).
For these reasons, the study required a purposeful sample of district members (Patton, 
2015, p. 264). The interviewees—Pierangelo Pedersoli, Cristina Abbiatico, and Emanuele 
Sabatti—possess extensive knowledge of the gun industry; their family businesses were 
deeply embedded in the local production system and operated in crucial segments during 
the years under investigation. Pedersoli is the owner and chief executive officer of the Davide 
Pedersoli & C., a family business established by his father in 1957, and a specialist in the 
production of historical firearm replicas. Pierangelo has been president of the Consorzio 
Armaioli Italiani since 1988 and holds several important institutional positions in the Italian 
firearms world. Abbiatico is the former chief executive officer of Famars, a gun-making firm 
founded in 1967 by Mario Abbiatico and Remo Salvinelli, which is well known in the firearms 
world for its patented detachable-lock designs and handcrafted woodworking and engrav-
ing. Sabatti is the sole director of Sabatti Spa, which commands a prominent position in the 
manufacturing of hunting and sporting shotguns; it was established in 1960 on the ashes 
of other family businesses and played a crucial role in the production of firearms components.
This article follows Martin and Sunley (2015, p. 12), whereby the study of any resilience 
process should answer four fundamental questions: resilience of what, to what, by what 
means, and with what outcome. After this introduction, we review the concept of resilience 
and prior literature on the resilience of industrial districts. The third section describes the 
characteristics of the Italian arms manufacturing district up to WWII and analyzes the crisis 
that was experienced at the end of the war. We then explore how the district adapted and 
recovered from the crisis by specialising in new market segments, followed by an examina-
tion of the factors that enabled adaptation and laid the foundation for the district’s new 
competitive advantage. This study concludes with a summary of our main findings.
2. The resilience of industrial districts
After the economic crisis in 2008, academic interest in economic fluctuations, crises and 
recovery processes, and the notion of resilience was revived, spreading from natural sciences 
to economics and regional studies. There is no unanimously accepted definition of resilience 
(Martin et al., 2016, p. 564), although Martin and Sunley (2015, p. 4) identified three primary 
variants. The first, engineering resilience, describes the ability of a system to regain its previous 
equilibrium after a shock. The second, extended ecological resilience, refers to the ability to 
absorb such events without modifying the structure, identity, and function of the system, 
although some of its characteristics change. The third definition, evolutionary resilience, was 
developed by economic geographers and describes resilience as a positive adaptation to 
shocks that allows the system to survive through changes even when they are massive and 
radical. According to this approach, regardless of the degree of transformation that they 
undergo in the recovery process, less vulnerable economies are more resilient and recover 
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faster from shocks to sustain long-term development. This evolutionary process creates new 
growth paths rather than recovering to a stable state of equilibrium (Simmie & Martin, 
2010, p. 31).
From a historical perspective, the concept of evolutionary resilience is especially suitable 
for analysing the processes of economic recovery after crises in industrial territories, because 
it proposes a long-term vision that considers both the industrial structure and networks of 
economic agents and institutions (Boschma, 2015, p. 743). Our analysis of the recovery of 
the firearms district is based on the concept of evolutionary resilience combined with two 
other interesting concepts contributed by economic geography: adaptation and adaptability. 
According to Pike et al. (2010, p. 9), adaptation can be defined as ‘a movement towards a 
pre-conceived path in the short run, characterised by strong and tight couplings between 
social agents in place’, while adaptability would be ‘the dynamic capacity to effect and unfold 
multiple evolutionary trajectories, through loose and weak couplings between social agents 
in place, that enhance the overall responsiveness of the system to unforeseen changes’. 
Drawing from these concepts and theoretical proposals of economic geography can be very 
useful for business history because they offer a structure for historical research, as pointed 
out by other studies (Amdam et al., 2020, p. 2; Plantinga, 2020, p. 2). Moreover, historical 
analysis can decisively contribute to supporting the theories of economic geography with 
empirical evidence and enriching their approaches by framing them in a certain technolog-
ical and economic context, and by considering the influence of stakeholders’ decisions 
(Henning, 2019, p. 608).
In situations of resilience, available resources and capabilities influence the adaptations 
made to the new context; such factors are mostly the result of previous patterns of regional 
development and the intervention of local or national institutions (Simmie & Martin, 2010, 
p. 32). According to the approaches of economic geography, diversified economies tend to 
resist negative impacts better because their activities are not equally affected. Their hetero-
geneity increases their adaptability and the possibility of developing new growth paths 
(Davies & Tonts, 2010; Dawley et al., 2010, p. 657). Despite this, closer relationships among 
different industries in a region, especially concerning knowledge and skills, foster a greater 
ability to positively adapt, recover, and evolve, making adaptation and adaptability compat-
ible (Boschma, 2015; Frenken et al., 2005). This heterogeneity is path-dependent and strongly 
influences regional resilience. Taking a business history approach, Amdam et al. (2020) high-
lighted that the ability to recover from external shocks in the Norwegian region of Sunnmøre 
between 1920 and 2010 was widely supported by the development of various related activ-
ities. unlike regions with diversified industries, specialised regions are considered to have 
an elevated level of adaptation but low adaptability, as they can suffer a state of negative 
lock-in with little potential to recombine resources to develop new activities (Boschma, 2015, 
p. 739).
unfortunately, there is a paucity of literature on the extent to which the concentration 
of activity in highly specialised industrial districts influences resilience. In principle, we would 
expect districts to have a greater ability to adapt and overcome crises, given that external 
economies of agglomeration, together with the typical combination of competition and 
cooperation within industrial districts, have a positive effect on companies’ efficiency and 
innovation (Miranda & Montaño, 2017; Porter, 2003; Signorini, 1994; Spencer et al., 2010). 
Strong links among companies can weaken the effects of a negative shock because of long-
term relationships with customers, a more efficient labour market, and trust among economic 
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agents and local institutions that can facilitate credit (Delgado et al., 2016). Moreover, the 
cognitive and social proximity among the economic stakeholders of the district favours an 
efficient adaptation to technological and market changes because it improves information 
transmission and reduces the risk of opportunistic behaviour (Crespo et al., 2014, p. 204).
However, since agglomeration economies do not necessarily provide the capacity to 
withstand technological or market disturbances, they do not guarantee long-term economic 
success (Wilson & Popp, 2017, p. 8). The strong specialisation of industrial districts, along 
with the interdependent relationships among companies, could represent a disadvantage 
(Acemoglu et al., 2013; Barrot & Sauvagnat, 2016). Many districts have succumbed to crises 
throughout history and have ultimately disappeared (Toms & Filatotchev, 2017, pp. 81–87). 
Other districts, whose specialisation has survived over time, such as the concentration of 
British pottery manufacture in North Staffordshire, have based their resilience more on com-
panies’ strategies than on district dynamics (Popp, 2001).
The debate on the resilience of industrial districts has largely focussed on their ability to 
cope with the challenges arising from economic globalisation since the late twentieth cen-
tury. However, although globalisation has generated a critical juncture for many districts, 
the study of the adaptability of these socio-economic structures cannot be limited to that 
period. A historical analysis allows us to observe strong recessive impacts faced by districts 
at other times, and how their evolution has been affected by internationalisation processes 
and many other endogenous and exogenous factors (Belussi & Sedita, 2009, p. 506). This 
article investigates the adaptation process at another critical juncture—the crisis after 
WWII—and the configuration of a new international economic order. It should be noted 
that the firearms district was not the only case of successful long-term adaptation after the 
post-war crisis in highly specialised industrial territories. A similar trajectory can be observed, 
for example, in other local production systems of the so-called Third Italy, which were able 
to recover and engage in steady growth, at least until the 1980s, competing successfully in 
national and international markets (Grandi, 2007, pp. 33–40; Nuti, 1992; Pyke et al., 1990).
Explaining differences in districts’ coping abilities to markets and technology changes 
throughout history, Zeitlin (2007, pp. 225–227) highlights the importance of having effective 
institutions for conflict resolution and the provision of collective services. Districts with effec-
tive internal coordination and governance mechanisms to deal with collective problems are 
better positioned to face difficulties and adapt to new challenges. Similar conclusions emerge 
from studies by Hashino and Kurosawa (2013) and Amdam and Bjarnar (2015). Wilson and 
Popp (2017, p. 8) also underline the importance of the institutional environment while con-
tributing other elements to the list of factors that profoundly affects the capacity of industrial 
districts to endure disturbances and shocks. These factors include the national and interna-
tional macroeconomic context, the nature of negative impacts, the internal structure of 
production concentrations (their composition of activities and relationships), and the specific 
dynamics of stakeholders.
From a business history perspective, the individual and collective behaviour of the dis-
trict’s stakeholders is especially relevant. Most studies on the determinants of resilience have 
focussed on the structures of regional or local economies, indicating which structures are 
more sensitive to recessive impacts and which have greater adaptive capacity. However, 
there is a paucity of literature on how resilience works over time, and little attention has 
been paid to stakeholders and elements that enable some regions to show greater resilience 
than others (Bristow & Healy, 2015, p. 242). By focussing on the case of the Italian gun-making 
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district, this study investigates the behaviour of economic agents and public institutions in 
industrial districts during crises, showing the relationship between the adaptive response 
and economic, social, and institutional contexts. The theoretical framework of economic 
geography provides a structure for historical analysis, while in-depth historical analysis of a 
specific case enables us to qualify theoretical approaches while revealing the influence of 
production specialisation and context in the resilience process.
Our investigation into the Italian gun-making district’s resilience in the post-war era is 
also significant for other intertwined reasons. First, it bridges a gap in the historiography of 
the local production system. Despite numerous studies on its production dynamics in the 
early and late modern periods (Semeraro, 2017–2018), a detailed and theoretically well-
grounded analysis (Becattini, 2004; Markusen, 1996) of its structure in the 1950s and 1960s 
is still lacking. Second, our study contextualises the development of the Italian light weapons 
sector in the post-war transformations of the military industry and, accordingly, contributes 
to the historiography of the national arms trade. This corroborates that, after WWII, this 
industry underwent a reorganisation rather than a complete restructuring process (Selva, 
2009, p. 272); in the district under investigation, this industrial reorganisation took place 
through novel specialisation within the arms trade. Moreover, our study supports Selva 
(2009, p. 267), whose findings clash with mainstream studies on the Italian military industry 
in the second half of the twentieth century (Battistelli, 1980; Segreto, 2005; Simoncelli, 1994), 
by providing evidence that, alongside state intervention, production specialisation, diver-
sification, and strong initiatives to enter foreign markets were crucial factors in overcoming 
crises and adapting the sector to changes in the structure of domestic and interna-
tional demand.
3. Post-war crisis: the umpteenth turning point in a long story
In the mid-twentieth century, the core of the gun-making industrial district of Brescia 
included the central area of the Trompia Valley (Val Trompia), comprising the towns of 
Gardone, Marcheno, and Sarezzo. Gun-making firms were also based in other towns and 
villages of Brescia province; however, the central Val Trompia was more highly concentrated 
and specialised in the sector (Fontana, 2009; Rinaldi, 2008, pp. 192–193; Semeraro, 2017, pp. 
69–72; Tombola, 2000). This was due to the war and post-war dynamics, together with ‘the 
result of a long and enduring historical process […] dating back to the age before the first 
industrial revolution’ (Colli, 2009, p. 59).
The gun industry in Val Trompia has early modern roots. In the sixteenth century, in Brescia 
province, firearms manufacturing developed out of the prosperous mining and iron indus-
tries that flourished during (if not before) the Middle Ages (Montanari, 1982). This activity 
was organised according to a scheme based on strong production fragmentation, a put-
ting-out system, strong family ties, and craft guilds. Centred in Gardone, a network of work-
shops active in the field with different skills and duties spread to the surrounding villages 
and, following the Mella River, reached the city of Brescia (Belfanti, 1998; Mocarelli & Ongaro, 
2017; Morin & Held, 1980, pp. 55–56).
Over the centuries, local gun-making has undergone periods of great prosperity and 
profound crises, from which it was able to recover due to changes in its production structure, 
the activities of specific producers, and the intervention of government authorities (Semeraro, 
2017–2018). The late nineteenth century represents a turning point in the modernisation 
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and industrialisation of this local production system. During this period, the governmental 
authorities of the Kingdom of Italy revived local production by reactivating the two seats of 
the local government arsenal, previously opened by Napoleonic France and subsequently 
closed by the Austrians (Montanari, 1999), and by introducing technological innovation into 
the production process. Although the stimulus from public intervention was limited and 
influenced by political rather than economic reasons, it motivated certain firms to take charge 
of the district. These companies flanked the government arsenal and diversified by investing 
in the manufacturing of hunting weapons. They led the district, albeit in a persistently back-
ward fashion compared to other European production centres, during a long transition 
phase before the significant transformations of the interwar years (Semeraro, 2020).
After experiencing a sharp increase in production during the Great War (Semeraro, 2019), 
the district had to contend with a significant reduction during the return to peace. This was 
coupled with long delays in adopting the most advanced production techniques. Throughout 
the Fascist Period, in stark contrast to what was happening in the rest of the world, the degree 
of technological progress in the Italian light weapons industry was very modest, due to the 
substantial absence of industrial investments in labour-saving plants and machinery. Such 
delays prevented the occurrence of concentration and restructuring processes similar to 
those occurring in other European districts at the time. In Brescia, antiquated pistols and 
nineteenth-century rifles continued to be produced. Changes only occurred in the late 1930s, 
when large state orders were placed as a result of the new nationalistic economic policy of 
the fascist regime that provided local firms with great earning and growth opportunities 
(Del Barba, 2008, p. 88).
The production and technological conditions of the district in the interwar years are well 
illustrated by the development of its two leading companies, Beretta and Bernardelli. Beretta 
did not embrace Taylorism until 1928, when machinery acquired from the firm Fabbrica 
d’Armi Lario, Como, was transferred to Gardone, requiring a reorganisation of the plant and 
layout. This historical company took a dimensional leap in 1935 when, because of the Second 
Italo-Ethiopian War and Italy’s intervention in Spain, it could benefit from large orders for 
the 1934 Model pistol, effectively launching its mass production (Jaikumar, 2005, pp. 69–70). 
Meanwhile, Bernardelli also made significant progress towards increasing its production: in 
1936, it became a limited company and increased its share capital substantially. The company 
redefined and expanded its production sectors: it no longer exclusively produced weapons 
but became a specialised mechanical engineering company capable of marketing its firearms 
while simultaneously conducting processes outsourced by other companies (Del Barba, 
2008, pp. 99–101).
On these technological and commercial bases, the district’s production developed during 
WWII. Gardone and the surrounding municipalities were distinctive in their manufacturing 
footprint, industrial production structure, and pervasive technologies in the transformation 
of ferrous materials. Work, trade, machine tools, rifles, and metal ropes characterised daily 
life. Large firms—Beretta, Bernardelli, and others—that converted their production to sup-
port the war effort dominated the local production system and gave rise to mechanisation 
and vertical integration strategies. Craft businesses were almost non-existent, and the pro-
duction of hunting firearms disappeared. In this context, salaried employment was essential 
for individuals, families, and social relations (Simoncelli, 1996; Baglioni, 2012). Italy’s entry 
into the war provided local firms with large orders and, consequently, with strong profits 
for the duration of the conflict. The district sidelined the production of civilian firearms to 
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concentrate most of its resources and capabilities in manufacturing and repairing the Italian 
army’s light armaments, although these were mostly obsolete when compared to the stan-
dards reached by other belligerent powers. Within this context, the local government arsenal 
maintained its crucial position as a major producer and the main source of orders of finished 
guns and spare parts subcontracted in the area (Albesio, 1969, p. 237; Del Barba, 2008, p. 110).
The last two years of the conflict severely affected Italy and its population. At the end of 
the war, the country faced pressing problems, mainly due to shortages of fuel and raw 
materials, precluding it from resuming its production and exports. Material destruction was 
compounded by high unemployment and poverty. Nevertheless, considering the Allied 
bombings and German occupation of northern Italy, the economic infrastructure was less 
impaired than expected. Despite widespread and heavy damage to agriculture, the merchant 
navy, and the rail network, the national industry’s production capacity fell by an average of 
only 10% compared to the pre-war period (Zamagni, 1997, pp. 29–30).
The conflict did not trigger any acceleration in the field of industrial research and devel-
opment nor had it stimulated, as was the case in other countries, a leap in technology. This 
further aggravated the distorting effects on production generated by the constant demand 
for equipment and war materials during the conflict (Crepax, 2002, p. 277). In the aftermath 
of the war, Italy dealt with the backwardness of its secondary sector and a serious problem 
of overproduction capacity. Although less traumatic than those experienced during the first 
post-war era, the Italian entrepreneurial class had to deal with significant re-conversion 
issues (Amatori, 1980, 2011; Mantovani, 1975; Mori, 1994). This was particularly true of the 
firearms industry, where the difficult situation was further aggravated by the almost total 
demilitarisation imposed by the binding clauses of the peace treaty of February 10, 1947. 
The latter established an international commission for the control of Italian production and 
investments in the military sector and imposed significant limits on the production and sale 
of arms (Bagnato & Verrini, 2005, p. 45; Battistelli, 1980, p. 121; Simoncelli, 1993, p. 81).
In the gun-making district of Brescia, the end of the war led to the suspension of Beretta’s 
production of individual weapons and machine guns for the Italian Social Republic and the 
interruption of Bernardelli’s contracts from Fiat, Breda, and the government factories of Terni, 
Rome, and Torre Annunziata. The Allies placed Beretta and Bernardelli under temporary receiv-
ership until 1948. The termination of war production contracts dealt a harsh blow to the arms 
manufacturing of Gardone and the other villages in the valley—the local system was on the 
brink of collapse in 1945 (ASBI, BI, Studi, Pratiche, n. 453, f. 1; Del Barba, 2008, pp. 136–147).
According to a report by a committee of the Italian Ministry of Industry and Trade, at the 
end of the war, in Brescia province, where almost all national small arms producers were 
located, five enterprises with seven production units survived—Breda, Beretta, Bernerdelli, 
Fabbrica Nazionale Armi, and Franchi, along with a few craft companies such as Gitti umberto, 
Fabbrica Armi Anelotti and Gualla, and Faverzani Pietro. Several other firms (such as Gnutti 
and Tempini) participated in military production efforts during the war years. However, they 
were not part of the gun-making industry as they normally operated in the steel and mechan-
ical engineering sectors. During wartime, they temporarily adapted their production to take 
advantage of military contracts; consequently, for them, reconversion was less arduous. The 
companies most damaged by the bombings were in the province’s capital, where the Breda 
factory lost 70% of its production capacity. In 1946, the provincial gun-making industry 
accounted for 6,500 employees with a surplus of 40–50% to needs (ACS, MIC, b. 107, 
‘Relazione sulla situazione industriale nel settore armi’, pp. 1–4).
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High taxes and labour costs, which represented between 75 and 80% of the product’s 
selling price, affected arms producers (ACS, MIC, b. 105, ‘Relazione 1948’, p. 129, and ‘Relazione 
1949’). In 1948, the situation deteriorated when the OM company (automotive sector), which 
had taken over the government arsenal after its closure by the Nazis in 1943, decided to 
vacate Gardone to reduce its costs with the loss of 1,500 jobs. In 1949, 5,000 people were 
estimated to be unemployed, and the workforce of local gun firms had been severely cut 
(ACGVT, Storico, b. 790, ff. 4.1–4.6). Table 1 includes data sent by the Brescia Chamber of 
Commerce to the Italian Ministry of Defense. It shows the dramatic consequences of the 
provincial arms industry crisis on employment and highlights that the firms that suffered 
most were those based in Val Trompia, specifically those that specialised in gun-making.
4. The shift towards civilian firearms: driver of the recovery
To cope with the sharp post-war market contraction, some firearms companies embarked 
on a related diversification strategy, commencing the production of other metal products. 
However, this diversification strategy had little success due to difficulties encountered in 
overcoming the market competition and adapting the gun-making machinery—arising from 
specificity and the wear and tear caused by intensive use during the conflict—to new types 
of manufacturing (ASCCBS, Carteggio 1943–1963, Categorie X–XXI, b. 261, f. 5; ACS, MIC, b. 
105, ‘Programma produzione anno 1946/1947’; and b. 107, ‘Relazione sulla situazione indus-
triale nel settore armi’, p. 3). In the early 1950s, Breda Meccanica Bresciana began producing 
motors, but soon had to succumb to competition from Lambretta and Vespa. Beretta con-
stitutes another example of a gun-making company that pursued a diversification strategy 
and obtained mixed results. In 1948, the historical company registered two patents related 
to the transportation sector. More specifically, these patents were for two fundamental motor 
vehicle components—the engine and suspension—that formed the basis of the develop-
ment of an economy car. However, production was never launched by the company. Starting 
in 1950, Beretta decided to increase its share in the capital of Mival, which in 1949 had 
acquired a portion of the plant of the local government arsenal. In this example, the diver-
sification strategy was characterised by successes and challenges. The firm achieved good 
results in the machine tools industry but experienced significant problems in the production 
of vehicles and audio and video systems, two sectors that Mival abandoned in the mid-1960s. 
Pioneering, but very short-lived, was the investment made by Beretta together with 
underwood Corporation (a foreign partner) in underwood Italiana Spa. The company was 
established in Gardone in 1958 to manufacture office machinery and accessories. However, 
due to significant losses, Beretta sold the majority share to Olivetti in October 1959 and 
vacated the board of directors in February 1960 (Onger & Paris, 2012, pp. 85–110; Paris, 2016).
The most effective response to the crisis caused by the interruption in military orders was 
the search for new market segments within the arms sector. The conversion of production 
to civilian firearms enabled the local system to find a new growth path. Specialisation in 
hunting and sporting shotguns enabled local producers to benefit from Italy’s gradual inte-
gration into international markets and provided new impetus to the industrial district. The 
shift made it possible to take advantage of the unemployed skilled labour force and avoid 
the loss of human capital in the district. This process was conducted by deepening the 
decentralisation of production and informal production coordination mechanisms following 
the Marshallian industrial district. Many people who had lost their jobs were skilled workers 

























































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































trained in large factories in the valley, especially in Beretta and the government arsenal. Some 
of them had attended the local vocational school with general studies in mechanical engi-
neering and specific training in gunsmithing (Abbiatico, 1984; Baglioni, 2012). Many of the 
valley’s inhabitants decided to start businesses by opening small workshops to reinvest their 
technical skills in the manufacturing of hunting shotguns. According to surveys of the Bank 
of Italy’s provincial branch, around 100 craft gun-making firms operated in the area in 1953, 
rising to 130 units three years later (ASBI, BI, Studi, Pratiche, n. 469, f. 1, and n. 874, doc. 14). 
These micro-enterprises addressed two domains: 1) market niches based on a high degree 
of product customisation, as these small firms could dedicate themselves entirely to meet 
their customers’ needs; and 2) the subcontracting market, where they were able to carry out 
specific tasks or supply firearm parts at a lower cost to large companies and newly established 
craft enterprises (ASBI, BI, Studi, Pratiche, n. 459, f. 1; Fausti, 1954, p. 5; Fontana, 1955).
Figure 1 shows the direct relationship between the production of civilian firearms and 
the vast flourishing network of small businesses. In 1961, a total of 101 local businesses (37% 
of the total) were end-producers, primarily manufacturing civilian firearms, and employing 
593 people, thus representing 19% of the firearms production labour force in the three towns 
under study (Gardone, Marcheno, and Sarezzo). They were mainly artisans who reinvested 
their craft skills by opening small businesses that focussed on a small number of products, 
especially side-by-side shotguns in the early post-war era, and over-under shotguns in the 
1960s. The dates of incorporation further confirm that the network of SMEs developed sig-
nificantly after Liberation: only five of the 101 businesses in the category of Civilian firearms 
manufacturing were established before 1945. Of the 272 firms in the district, only 19 were 
created before that date (ASCCBS, Carteggio 1943–1963, Categorie XXII–XXXII, bb. 947, 
959, 980).
Figure 1. Firms and employees per type of activity in the firearms industry of Gardone, Marcheno, and 
sarezzo (1961). 
Source. AsCCBs, Carteggio 1943–1963, Categorie XXii–XXXii, bb. 947, 959, 980 (data processed by the 
authors).
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Large factory owners did not ignore the growth of an intense network of craft businesses. 
In 1950, when the sector was still struggling, they drafted a report to the Ministry of Industry 
and Trade, complaining about the illegal position of many small workshops that had recently 
opened (ASCCBS, Carteggio 1943–1963, Categorie I–IX, b. 97, f. 19). According to industrialists, 
there were two major problems. First, many craft businesses were not listed in the Companies 
Register, nor were they authorised by the relevant authorities for firearms manufacturing 
and marketing: the report estimated that 4,338 shotguns out of 9,985 in 1948, and 3,970 out 
of 15,778 in 1949, were produced clandestinely. Second, craft businesses largely relied on 
black market labour (unemployed people or workers from other factories moonlighting 
during their non-working hours), paying the labour force half their normal salaries with no 
social security contributions. This report showed that the district’s cost competitiveness was 
not only supported by greater efficiency, but also by utilising the informal economy.
Data on the guns provided by the Banco Nazionale di Prova (National Proof House; here-
after BNP) also demonstrate that new entrepreneurs specialised in civilian firearms, while 
the production of military weapons was concentrated in large traditional companies (Figure 2; 
ASBI, BI, Studi, Pratiche, n. 929, doc. 9). After the war, the production of long guns gradually 
increased from zero to a peak of 320,324 units in 1968, surpassing the 100,000- and 200,000-
unit thresholds in 1954 and 1964, respectively. The double-barrelled hunting shotgun played 
a vital role in the recovery; more specifically, side-by-side shotguns led to recovery through-
out the 1950s, whereas over-and-under shotguns—first produced industrially and then by 
artisans—led local production in the 1960s. From the 1960s onwards, the growth of semi-au-
tomatic rifles and shotguns was also highly significant. Semi-automatic rifles and shotguns 
drove the development of the most heavily industrialised companies, but their potential 
was progressively limited by statutory regulations restricting their use and distribution. 
Short-barreled firearms for personal defense were manufactured mainly by larger companies; 
Figure 2. Proofed civilian firearms (1939–1972). 
Source. Bontempi (1970, pp. 132–146); Pagani and Camarlinghi (2010, pp. 34–37) (data processed by 
the authors).
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their figures were similar to those of shotguns in the 1950s, but their proportion of total 
production decreased over the decade that followed (Tosini, 1980, pp. 47–49).
The reproduction of earlier and obsolete types of firearms was another increasingly import-
ant market niche. In 1970, muzzle-loading rifles and pistols represented 15.75% of single shot-
guns proved by the BNP. The first producer was Aldo uberti, who in 1959—when the uSA was 
preparing to celebrate the centenary of the American Civil War—received an order of 4,000 
units of muzzle-loading rifles and pistols. After this unexpected windfall, producers in the valley 
moved into this novel and unexplored North American market segment. In Montana, North 
Dakota, and Texas, many hunting and target-shooting collectors and aficionados practiced 
using these types of firearms (Interview with Pedersoli; Daffini, 1969, pp. 220–222).
These products found their way into national and international markets. The Italian market 
was important during the very early post-war era, but by the early 1950s, its relevance 
declined rapidly. This was due to its limited potential and increased constraints on the pos-
session and sale of firearms introduced by the government. The domestic market mainly 
comprised firearms for hunting, a popular activity with a long tradition, and was extremely 
sensitive to legislative norms. Severe fiscal tightening through taxes on hunting licences 
between 1961 and 1962 led to a rapid decline in firearms sales and, consequently, decreased 
production. Only after the partial reversal of the tax decisions did the decline cease (Bontempi, 
1970, pp. 203–210).
Foreign markets played a key role in relaunching the sector. At the end of WWII, exports 
were at very low levels, but the situation began to improve significantly when Italy joined 
NATO (Western Block countries) and GATT in 1949 and 1950, respectively. NATO, together 
with a review of the constraints imposed by the peace treaty, provided firms with new military 
orders while increasing their sales to the police following the American model for public 
order management. GATT enabled Italy to market its sporting shotguns beyond national 
borders (Battistelli, 1980, pp. 90, 128; Del Barba, 2008, pp. 141–146).
Exports, which were relatively low during the early 1950s, gradually grew both in absolute 
and relative terms, reaching 30–40% of total production in the 1960s (when local production 
represented 95–98% of national production) (ASBI, BI, Studi, Pratiche, n. 900, doc. 12; n. 920, 
doc. 11; n. 942, doc. 2; n. 948, doc. 9). In 1953, decent export levels to the Middle East, uSA, 
Belgium, France, Scandinavia, and Portugal were recorded. Between 1955 and 1956—when 
the domestic market contracted—local companies strengthened their position on foreign 
markets while approaching new ones, such as Mexico, by attending international trade 
shows (ASBI, BI, Studi, Pratiche, n. 469, f. 1; n. 479, f. 1; n. 874, doc. 14). During the 1960s, the 
uSA, France, Germany, and the united Kingdom were the main buyers of civilian firearms 
made in Brescia, absorbing more than 70% of total exports (ASBI, BI, Studi, Pratiche, n. 910, 
doc. 6; Bontempi, 1970, pp. 219–221).
Transformation challenges and problems in other European gun-making districts made 
it easier to dominate markets. Production systems such as Val Trompia existed in Belgium 
(Liège), France (Saint-Étienne), England (Birmingham), and Spain (Eibar). Nevertheless, in 
the post-war era, the craft component of most foreign districts progressively declined, paving 
the way for Italian firms. In Belgium, a combination of socioeconomic factors (such as the 
decline of the home-based system, political instability, import restrictions, and the with-
drawal of the Eastern bloc) seriously weakened the gun-making district, which shrunk to 
eight towns while shifting the centre of gravity from Liège to Herstal due to the pre-eminence 
of the famous Fabrique Nationale as a source of employment (Gaier, 1985, pp. 215–228). In 
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Birmingham, component supply shortages (such as moulds, forgings, and barrel-tubes) and 
legislative measures limiting weapon ownership (Dunham, 1955, pp. 33–35; Williams, 2009, 
p. 146) further aggravated the profound consequences of WWII air raids. In Eibar, in the 
Basque Country of Spain, where the gun trade specialised in short-barreled firearms (Goñi, 
2010, 2018), two regulations approved in 1941 and 1944 conditioned the authorisation of 
short firearm production to a single facility, thus forcing vertical integration. Moreover, 
Basque products were initially affected by the Spanish trade embargo and the limitations 
of the domestic market, they subsequently became dependent on institutional aid to 
approach foreign markets (Goñi, 2009, pp. 91–93).
Three major inter-related reasons determined the advantages of the Italian district over 
its European competitors. First, in contrast to foreign producers who faced significant cost 
increases, Italian manufacturers had abundant low-cost skilled labour (Castronovo, 2010, 
pp. 29–31; Forissier, 2005, p. 62; Gaier, 1985, pp. 225–226; Selva, 2012, p. 93). Second, foreign 
districts underwent vertical integration, experiencing a heavy reduction in artisanship activ-
ity (Del Barba, 2008, pp. 150–151; Gaier, 1985, pp. 222, 226–228; Williams, 2009, p. 141). Third, 
a growing number of foreign gunmakers started to subcontract to Italian producers, fostering 
a process of technological development in the Italian district, which improved the quality 
and image of local products (Interview with Pedersoli; Forissier, 2005, pp. 62–63; Onger & 
Paris, 2012, pp. 83–85). Accordingly, similar to other regions of the country in the 1950s and 
1960s, the gun-making district increased production and investment and achieved greater 
economies of scale and, above all, economies of specialisation of small businesses that rep-
resented the primary source of new jobs (Castronovo, 2010, pp. 82–92; Rey, 1982, pp. 
505–518).
5. Production decentralization as a competitive strategy
With the introduction of the American system of manufacturing in the nineteenth century, 
the military sector embraced the path of mechanisation and parts interchangeability, 
whereas the civilian sector remained loyal to artisanship. Customers, especially in the field 
of hunting shotguns, continued to seek products created using traditional manufacturing 
methods where hand fitting played a key role. The production of shotguns required a large 
number of skilled workers organised in a production chain that included gun barrel makers, 
lock manufacturers, movement preparers, modellers, inlayers, polishers, chequerers, engrav-
ers, repairers, smoothers, brazers, burnishers, finishers, and assemblers (Zoli, 1969, pp. 198–
202). These artisans could work as employees within the same company; however, within 
the industrial district, many of them owned small businesses and were subcontracted. 
Production growth in the post-war era was achieved because of the multiplication of this 
decentralised structure.
A total of 62% of firms and 22% of workers associated with firearm production in some 
form were engaged in subsidiary industries; they executed specific phases in the production 
cycle or other support activities for end producers (Figure 1). These businesses specialised 
in producing and repairing parts, specific phases of assembly, engraving, inlaying, chequer-
ing, smoothing, and stock manufacturing. Mechanical engineering and woodworking firms 
operated sporadically in the gun trade according to the market’s particular needs and oppor-
tunities (Interview with Pedersoli). Gun-part manufacturers supplied the series—all the main 
components of the shotgun—to end producers, who, in most cases, were unable to produce 
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them; this enabled end-producers to acquire a coordinating function in the production 
process by conducting and/or subcontracting assembly and refining operations of the series 
to customise the final product (Interviews with Pedersoli, Abbiatico, and Sabatti). Subsidiary 
activities were mainly directed to third parties, and they differed from end-producers by 
order-type management, while the end-producers mainly operated with and without pre-or-
ders, the majority of the former carried out their work based exclusively on customer orders 
(Figure 3).
The family was a crucial element in the local production dynamics. According to the 
database, 61 of 272 companies (approximately 22.5%) were run by family members or 
included family members among their employees. However, by excluding firms where the 
owner was the only worker (120), the percentage increased to 68.5% (ASCCBS, Carteggio 
1943–1963, Categorie XXII–XXXII, bb. 947, 959, 980). Likely, even within firms that officially 
presented themselves as single-person businesses, family members would assist in a sporadic 
and unreported manner. Anecdotal evidence and interviews indicate that official statistics 
underestimated the extent of family ties. As repeatedly shown in the life stories of gun-mak-
ers collected by Abbiatico (1984), knowledge and skills in gun-making were passed on within 
families—from fathers to sons, or from grandparents and uncles to grandsons and nephews. 
It was not unusual for artisans to refuse to train non-relatives, thereby pressurising their 
employers to hire family members (Interview with Abbiatico). Moreover, family ties were 
used to temporarily allocate gun-making licences: employed artisans who were setting up 
their businesses had their licences assigned to one of their relatives (usually their wives). 
Hence, aspiring entrepreneurs solved two problems: they could overcome the constraints 
preventing licences from being assigned to employed workers, and they were able to start 
their business while maintaining their employment in another company.
Figure 3. Firms per type of order system in the firearms industry of Gardone, Marcheno, and sarezzo 
(1961). 
Source. AsCCBs, Carteggio 1943–1963, Categorie XXii–XXXii, bb. 947, 959, and 980 (data processed by 
the authors).
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Although a significant proportion of artisans worked from home (23%), most companies 
claimed that they had their own premises. However, two aspects are noteworthy. First, these 
data were not homogeneously distributed; for certain categories, especially businesses spe-
cialising in engraving, inlaying, and chequering, their situation was exactly the opposite. 
Second, all interviewees claimed that home represented an additional workplace after official 
working hours: when shifts ended, many workers in large firms brought their work home or 
worked for local artisans in their garages or basements. Those who merely worked the rec-
ognised eight hours were considered as slackers by the locals; thus, work permeated people’s 
lives and was regularly brought back home to be completed by the whole family (Interviews 
with Pedersoli, Abbiatico, and Sabatti).
The large network of SMEs relied on craftworking methods and the technical expertise 
of their owners. A total of 76% of businesses that participated in the census indicated that 
they did not mass produce, and only 16% used partially or fully mechanised methods (data 
for the remaining 8% are not available). A total of 80% of the owners participated in manu-
facturing activities and worked side-by-side with their employees (ASCCBS, Carteggio 1943–
1963, Categorie XXII–XXXII, bb. 947, 959, 980). The owners were also directly involved in the 
assembly of machinery used in daily manufacturing activities. These craft tools were gener-
ally the result of incremental innovations associated with the entrepreneur’s technical skills. 
An artisan’s best-adopted solutions were then very often copied by others (Interviews with 
Pedersoli, Abbiatico, and Sabatti).
The post-war crisis was overcome by reversing the evolution that had taken place in the 
district in the previous decades. From the end of the nineteenth century, the main compa-
nies—Beretta and Bernardelli—driven by military orders during the two world wars, 
expanded through vertical integration and increasingly concentrated the production of the 
district. During the 1950s and 1960s, a multitude of new workshops and small companies 
emerged, developing a decentralised production system that enabled the industry to be 
highly competitive in the international market for hunting and sporting shotguns. However, 
the two largest companies, particularly Beretta, maintained the leadership of the district, 
not only because of their production volumes, earned reputation, and the technology trans-
fer they drove, but also because they were instrumental in shaping the district’s dynamics 
in two ways. First, they contributed to the emergence of a network of SMEs participating in 
subcontracting practices, especially in the manufacturing phases characterised by low-tech 
procedures. Second, employees of these leading companies likely had second jobs in the 
valley’s numerous craft workshops. Consequently, a mutual virtuous relationship was estab-
lished: large end-producers could outsource to smaller units to reduce production costs, 
while workshops could employ highly trained workers (Interviews with Pedersoli, Abbiatico, 
and Sabatti; Onger & Paris, 2012, p. 85).
Both Beretta and Bernardelli went back to focussing on military orders as soon as the 
political and economic context allowed it. Between 1949 and 1951, the Truman administration 
launched the Mutual Defense Assistance Programs and Mutual Security Programs to provide 
America’s European partners with military aid and assistance while pursuing foreign policy 
and economic purposes. Initially, these programs were based on bilateral agreements, and 
from 1951, they were channelled through NATO’s multilateral off-shore procurement system 
(Selva, 2012, pp. 49–54). In the first phase, the objective was to reactivate existing, war-
wracked production lines by reorganising and stimulating the output capacity of the average 
capital- and labour-intensive mechanical sectors through the introduction of American labour 
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organisation methods (Selva, 2012, p. 91). During the second phase, European rearmament 
was closely linked to the financial and monetary stabilisation of intra-European trade and 
payments, as well as to the European recovery from the dollar shortage (Selva, 2012, p. 50).
In this context, throughout the 1950s, Beretta and Bernardelli obtained large military 
contracts with good profit margins that enabled them to improve their financial positions 
and offer new opportunities to their subcontractors (ASBI, BI, Studi, Pratiche, n. 463, f. 1; n. 
469, f. 1; n. 472, f. 1; n. 479, f. 1; n. 874, doc. 14; n. 879, doc. 14). The revenues obtained facil-
itated new investments and technological advances, which in turn stimulated new impetus 
to the civilian firearms sector. In an environment where shared culture and values facilitated 
the transmission of knowledge and learning processes, these innovations spread throughout 
the district via various cooperative relationships among the companies and the frequent 
and close interactions between professionals and entrepreneurs (Giuliani, 2007, pp. 162–
163). The system combined the benefits of local clustering with easy access through hub 
companies and their external connections to innovations and new knowledge. When the 
military orders declined between the late 1950s and early 1960s, these investments enabled 
the district to rely on hunting, sporting, and small defensive arms, which had gained an 
excellent international reputation (ASBI, BI, Studi, Pratiche, n. 479, f. 1; n. 874, doc. 14; n. 885, 
doc. 9; n. 890, doc. 5; n. 897, doc. 14).
By obtaining contracts for NATO armies under licence from American companies, Beretta 
was able to establish a specific division dedicated to military products, halting its ongoing 
downsizing and creating a virtuous cycle that further boosted the relaunching of hunting 
shotguns (Onger & Paris, 2012, pp. 68–69). The contract for  a modified and updated version 
of the American M-1 Garand service rifle was crucial and had an impact that extended beyond 
the renovation of equipment. The rifle’s tighter tolerances and the complete interchange-
ability of its components pushed Beretta (who were not machine tool builders) to build 
machinery based on Garand’s principles, which had a deep impact on both its manufacturing 
system and organisation of production. Significantly, this historical company built its own 
fixturing, gauging, and tool systems, while introducing statistical process control to con-
stantly monitor machines to prevent process limit deviations (Jaikumar, 2005, pp. 74–77).
When the need to design an assault rifle arose, Beretta’s technological capability and 
experience enabled an excellent conversion of the Garand. At low cost, the old American 
pieces were given new  7.62 mm NATO calibre barrels, a new magazine and feeding system, 
and a new trigger mechanism that enabled fully automatic fire upon selection. under the 
name BM-59, this firearm—in three different versions—was adopted by the Italian army. 
Meanwhile, Beretta adapted their machinery and know-how to civilian production: the inter-
changeability of parts reached 100% for semi-automatic shotguns and 99% for over-and-
under guns (Morin & Held, 1980, pp. 234–235; Wilson, 2001, p. 169). Investments in R&D and 
production quality became milestones in Beretta’s business strategy and invigorated its 
forward-thinking commercial choices aimed at foreign markets. Accordingly, the old 
gun-making company strengthened its trade ties in South and North America by opening 
a plant in Brazil and establishing a long-term partnership with Galef & Son, a New York-based 
company (Onger & Paris, 2012, pp. 68–73).
Bernardelli made significant efforts to exploit the reopening of the international market 
and secured a solid position in the NATO provisions system (Del Barba, 2008, p. 145). In the 
civilian sector, the owners decided to recover the traditional side-by-side and launched a 
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single shotgun with a steel stock, fixed barrel, and removable magazine. It also invested in 
new machinery to manufacture semiautomatic pistols (calibers 7.65 and 9). In the early 
1950s, the company’s products were offered to foreign markets, capturing the attention of 
customers in South America (Brazil and Argentina), Africa (Morocco and South Africa), the 
Far East (India and Singapore), and the uSA. In the military sector, following its wide expe-
rience acquired during WWII in fuse production, Bernardelli was able to win large NATO 
supply contracts, and from 1951 to 1960, it obtained three-yearly orders for 400,000 fuses, 
and further orders for machine gun barrels and magazines (Del Barba, 2008, pp. 145–147).
The Italian gun-making district thus established a new path of development in the post-war 
era characterised by increased decentralisation and flexibility of production, with a multitude of 
small new companies specialising in some phase of the production process. However, the district 
continued to be hierarchised by traditional large end-producers. The production structure exhib-
ited many of the industrial district’s characteristics identified by Becattini (2004, pp. 19–33), but 
also those that Markusen (1996, pp. 302–304) defined as a hub-and-spoke district, caused by the 
dominance of large and vertically integrated companies surrounded by suppliers. A key factor 
for the survival of the district was the complex structure of relationships established between 
existing leading companies and new entrepreneurs. This structure enabled effective competition 
in a new expanding market segment. The companies that constituted the core of the district 
managed to maintain, at least partially, their production of military weapons while promoting 
the development of the production of civilian arms through the generation of spinoffs. This 
production fabric facilitated the flow of knowledge between the core and periphery of new firms, 
providing a great capacity to adapt to changes in the market (Piccoli, 1981, pp. 129–131).
As noted in other cases (Amdam & Bjarnar, 2015, pp. 714–715; Hashino & Kurosawa, 2013, 
pp. 511–513; Zeitlin, 2007, pp. 225–226), the district’s recovery process was facilitated by the 
internal cohesion, norms, and values shared by its inhabitants and firms, enabling the adoption 
of a common economic strategy. The coordinated action of local institutions that provided 
generic and specific services to local companies also had a significant influence. Among them, 
the Zanardelli vocational school, with its specific gun-making training program, played a 
fundamental role in providing specific skills and knowledge. The BNP, which ensured technical 
supervision of firearms and ammunition compliance with national and international legal 
standards, was another key institution because it functioned as an innovation intermediary 
(Howells, 2006, pp. 720–723), encouraging gun-makers to improve the quality of their prod-
ucts and adopt new techniques (ASBI, BI, Studi, Pratiche, n. 874, doc. 14; Abbiatico, 1984, pp. 
65–69). Mediation to solve problems among district stakeholders and national institutions 
was conducted mainly by local administrations, especially by the Municipality of Gardone 
where Angelo Grazioli, the local leader of the Christian Democrats, was mayor for six terms 
(from 1951 to 1980). Grazioli led lobbying activities to prevent the closure of the local gov-
ernment arsenal at the end of the war, mediated labour disputes that affected Beretta and 
Bernardelli in the early 1970s, and lobbied the government to defend the interests of the arms 
producers arising from projects to modify sector regulations (ACGVT, Storico, b. 790, ff. 4.1–4.6; 
b. 833, ff. 3–4; Deposito, b. ‘Pubblica sicurezza 1961 – Circolari’; Albesio, 1969, pp. 235–238).
6. Conclusions
The analysis of cases of the resilience of industrial districts in the past is essential to under-
stand the evolution of these socioeconomic formations, how they endured for so long in 
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difficult times, and what characteristics can allow them to adapt to new crises and remain 
competitive. The recovery of the Italian gun-making industrial district after WWII occurred 
in a highly specialised industrial territory that demonstrated a great capacity to adapt to a 
sector-specific shock (the collapse of military orders) and the general post-war economic 
crisis, without abandoning its sectoral specialisation. Its recovery was not based on Jacobs-
type externalities but rather on the intensification of Marshallian externalities. The district 
took advantage of its established resources and capabilities by reorganising them and devel-
oping a new type of product, civilian firearms, for both domestic and foreign markets. Some 
companies responded to the collapse of military demand by developing related diversifica-
tion in mechanical engineering production. However, this resilience strategy was less effec-
tive than the novel specialisation within the arms industry. Consistent with the theoretical 
approaches of economic geography, the advantages of local clustering and elevated levels 
of specialisation provided the Italian gun-making district with effective adaptation. 
Nevertheless, it was not merely a short-term adaptation, as suggested by theoretical 
approaches, but rather the district managed to establish a stable growth path that was 
maintained for more than half a century (Musso et al., 2012).
The evidence presented here suggests that the district had a competitive advantage 
through decentralisation and production flexibility, together with cost reduction mecha-
nisms and product differentiation, which enabled access to distinct market niches. The pro-
duction structure was adapted by intensifying the defining characteristics of industrial 
districts, using know-how and resources that had historically been consolidated within the 
local production system. The district developed a large network of SMEs, where two large 
companies, Beretta and Bernardelli, played a leading role as both manufacturers and social 
stakeholders. The resulting production chain comprised producers of weapon parts, small 
workshops (often home-based) dedicated to specialist manufacturing, assemblers, and 
small-sized firms devoted to high-quality firearms. Beretta and Bernardelli organised a decen-
tralised production structure. Both companies fostered the development of the SME network 
and established a mutually beneficial relationship. In the 1950s, they managed to channel 
important military orders to the district, facilitating the technological renovation that fuelled 
the production of civilian firearms. Both companies were instrumental in improving the 
international reputation of the district’s products and entering new foreign markets.
Another important conclusion is that this system was characterised by a strong labour 
division, creating a process of progressive sub-specialisation and accentuating the interde-
pendence of its various parts. The predominant relationship between the two main sections 
of the system was vertical, although the others were generally horizontal. Subcontracting 
enabled companies to minimise total unit costs by outsourcing destabilising production 
functions that presented non-homogeneous unit cost trends. These functions were entrusted 
to companies whose creation was often stimulated by the same company responsible for 
decentralisation. The new firms, which were predominantly and traditionally specialised in 
a single phase of the production process, gradually improved their efficiency through a 
process of learning by doing.
A third noteworthy element is that the know-how and consolidated resources in the local 
production context were fundamental elements. It could be suggested that local culture 
and values were also important because they determined the behaviour of economic agents, 
as evidenced by the key role played by workers from large companies. These gunsmiths 
were the main promoters of the district’s small business network, arising from their technical 
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training in a social context that encouraged a strong work ethic, entrepreneurial initiative, 
and the use of resources from within the family environment. The strong specialisation of 
the district implied that local institutions were highly oriented to satisfy the needs of the 
local industry. They played a key role in the reconfiguration of the production structure, 
providing essential services, coordinating action in the face of common problems, and inter-
vening in conflict resolution.
Finally, this study shows the need to expand research on issues that are particularly rel-
evant to understanding the resilience of industrial districts and contributing to the histo-
riography of the Italian armament industry. The first issue is the real effect of production 
specialisation on resilience, and it would be desirable to verify, from a historical perspective, 
whether highly specialised industrial territories were less able to promptly face recessive 
shocks than more diversified areas or, conversely, whether specialisation was a source of 
resources that facilitated recovery. The second theme worth investigating further is the role 
of leading companies in influencing the dynamics of local production systems: new studies 
should focus on the relationships between these firms and the rest of the production fabric 
and the socio-institutional environment, as well as on the influence of these relationships 
on districts’ ability to adapt to technological and market changes. Lastly, further investiga-
tions should also be conducted on the role of leading companies in the Italian firearms 
district. This study reconstructed the recovery of Beretta and Bernardelli’s military production 
in the context of the Western Bloc rearmament programs; however, in-depth analysis using 
corporate archives could provide further details on the two businesses and NATO’s strategies, 
and the development of the Italian armament sector in the late twentieth century.
Notes
 1. Gardone Val Trompia is a town in the province of Brescia, Lombardy, Italy.
 2. The notion of Marshallian industrial district, re-elaborated by Becattini and other authors on the basis 
of the Italian experience, refers to a socio-territorial entity characterized by the concentration of 
small and medium-sized companies, specialized in distinct phases or complementary activities 
within a common industrial sector, where external economies of access to services and auxiliary 
industries, accumulation of specific knowledge and availability of specialized labor are obtained.
 3. Markusen defines hub-and-spoke industrial districts as places ‘where a number of firms and/or 
facilities act as anchors or hubs to the regional economy, with suppliers and related activities 
spread out around them like spokes of a wheel’.
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